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the jurisdiction over an expired CBA has expired.  Last year, the Supreme Court denied a 
petition for writ of certiorari to the Third Circuit in In re Trump Entertainment Resorts, where 
the court held that a debtor may reject an expired collective bargaining agreement.4  
Consequently, courts remain divided on a debtor’s ability to reject an expired CBA.     
 
II. Bildisco Held That a CBA is an Executory Contract 
Prior to the enactment of Section 1113, section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code governed the 
acceptance or rejection of a CBA.  In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, the Supreme Court 
confirmed that a CBA was an executory contract as contemplated by Section 365 of the 
Bankruptcy Code.5  According to the Court, section 365 applies to all unexpired executory 
contracts.6  The Court found that any inference that a CBA is not included in section 365(a) is 
rebutted by the actual text of section 365 indicated that Congress was concerned with the scope 
of the DIP’s power regarding certain types of executory contracts and, accordingly, drafted the 
provision to limit the DIP’s power to reject or assume a contract in those circumstances.7  The 
Court continued, “[y]et none of the express limitations on the debtor-in-possession's general 
power under § 365(a) apply to collective-bargaining agreements.”8  The failure of Congress to 
draft an exception regarding a debtor’s ability to reject a CBA reflects Congress’ intention for 
Section 365 to apply to CBAs.9 
Accordingly, the Court held that: (1) a collective bargaining agreement could be rejected 
under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code as an “executory contract”, and (2) a debtor-employer 
                                                
4 United Here Local 54 v. Trump Entm't Resorts, Inc., 136 S.Ct. 2396 (2016). 
5 465 U.S. 513 (1984).   
6 Id. at 521.   
7 Id.   
8 Id.   
9 Id.   
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did not violate its labor law duties by unilaterally modifying collectively bargained terms and 
conditions of employment before seeking or obtaining court authorization to reject the 
agreement.10  The Court reasoned that a collective bargaining agreement was “no longer 
immediately enforceable,” meaning that a CBA was non-binding and may never be binding, 
when an employer files for reorganization.11 
III. Section 1113 Provides Procedural Safeguards for Employees 
The Bildisco decision was met with instant opposition by organized labor.12  The decision 
reinforced existing fears that companies used the “bankruptcy law as an offensive weapon in 
labor relations.”13  Congress enacted Section 1113, which “replace[d] the Bildisco standard with 
one that was more sensitive to the national policy favoring collective bargaining agreements.”14 
Section 1113 provides heightened procedural and substantive requirements for allowing a 
debtor to reject a CBA.  Courts have adopted the nine-factor test articulated in In re American 
Provision Co., to determine if a debtor has adequately complied with section 1113 requirements, 
thus allowing the Trustee to reject the CBA.15  The nine factors are: (1) the debtor must make a 
proposal to the union to modify the CBA; (2) the proposal must be based on complete and 
reliable information; (3) the proposed modifications must be necessary to permit the 
reorganization; (4) the proposed modifications must assure that all affected parties are treated 
fairly and equitably; (5) the debtor must provide necessary information to the union; (6) the 
debtor must meet at reasonable times with the union; (7) the debtor must confer in good faith in 
                                                
10 Id. at 514.   
11 Id. at 532. 
12 See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 791 F.2d 1074, 1082–84 (3d Cir. 1986).   
13 Adventure Resources, Inc. v. Holland, 137 F.3d 786, 797–98 (4th Cir. 1998). 
14 Wheeling-Pittsburg Steel Corp., 791 F.2d at 1089.  
15 44 B.R. 907, 909 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984).   
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attempting to modify the CBA; (8) the union must have refused to accept the proposal without 
good-cause; and (9) the balance of the equities must clearly favor rejection of the CBA.16 
Further, section 1113(f) provides that the Bankruptcy Code “shall be construed to permit 
a trustee to unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of a collective bargaining agreement 
prior to compliance with the provisions of this section.”17  This safeguard supersedes provisions, 
including the automatic stay under section 362, when the requirements of the section are not 
met.18  
IV. Inconsistent Application of Section 1113 to Expired CBA’s Among Bankruptcy 
Courts 
 
Section 1113 applies to CBAs in lieu of section 365.  Though Congress intended for 
section 1113 to act as a safeguard for employees, courts have interpreted it to favor business 
interests.  Accordingly, the question of section 1113’s application to expired CBAs remains open 
because the plain language of the statute does not limit its application to unexpired CBAs.  
Courts have grappled with competing interests in determining the application of section 1113 to 
expired collective bargaining agreements.   
A. Rejection Not Permitted by the Court 
 In In re Sullivan Motor Delivery, Inc., the Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of 
Wisconsin refused to apply section 1113 to an expired agreement.19  The debtor filed for relief 
under chapter 11 on September 23, 1985.20  On October 8, 1985, the debtor moved to reject the 
                                                
16 Id. 
17 11 U.S.C 1113(f).   
18 See In re Pearl Cos., 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2896 *, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 540 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2010) 
(prohibiting the application of the automatic stay when such application would permit a debtor to achieve a 
unilateral termination or modification of a collective bargaining agreement without meeting the requirements of 
section 1113). 
19 56 B.R. 28, 29 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1985). 
20 Id.   
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CBA with the union pursuant to section 1113.21  Notwithstanding that the CBA at issue had 
expired several months prior to the petition date, the court considered the explicit guidance set 
forth in Bildisco, which specifically held that an unexpired CBA is an executory contract.22  The 
bankruptcy court reasoned that it “does not believe that § 1113 intended a bankruptcy court to 
intrude into an area of labor law reserved exclusively for the expertise of the National Labor 
Relations Board under circumstances where a collective bargaining agreement by its own terms 
expired before the Chapter 11 case was filed.”23  The bankruptcy court concluded its decision by 
reiterating that under these circumstances the parties still had certain rights and obligations to 
one another – including the obligation to bargain to impasse before the employer could make 
unilateral changes to the CBA.24  The court concluded that the National Labor Relations Act, not 
Section 1113, governs situations where stability in bargaining relations is required.25 
In In Re Chas P. Young Company, the Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New 
York held that a debtor may not reject a CBA pursuant to § 1113 if the agreement has expired by 
its own terms.26  In this case, the contract between the employer and the union expired on 
October 3, 1989.27  On April 26, 1989, union representatives formally met with management to 
negotiate a new CBA to no avail.28  Interim relief was granted on September 26th of the same 
year and was extended until after the CBA expired.29 
In this case, the bankruptcy court reasoned that because section 1113(f) incorporated the 
underlying assumption that there was an existing collective contract to reject or modify, and 
                                                
21 Id. at 28. 
22 Id. at 29. 
23 Id. at 30. 
24 Id.   
25 Id. 
26 In re Charles P. Young Co., 111 B.R. 410, 413 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).   
27 Id. at 411.   
28 Id.   
29 Id.    
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because the contract expired by its own terms there was nothing left to reject or assume. The 
court concluded that a CBA may be executory on the date the debtor’s bankruptcy petition is 
filed, but once the agreement expires of its own terms, the debtor’s application to reject it 
becomes moot.30 
The court in In Re San Rafael Baking Company Co., held that no authority vests in the 
bankruptcy court to award benefit payments under an expired collective bargaining agreement.31  
Here, the union argued the holding in In Re Hoffman Brothers supported the bankruptcy court’s 
authority to order the continuation of benefit payments in order to maintain the status quo ante.  
However, the court rejected the argument in In Re Hoffman Brothers as dicta.32  Instead, the 
court held that only the National Labor Relations Board has subject matter jurisdiction to make 
such an award for violations of an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations 
Act and section 1113 does not apply to an expired CBA.33 
 In In re Hostess Brands, Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
York held that section 1113 did not apply to collective bargaining agreements that expired pre-
petition, despite the fact that certain terms of the CBA continued in effect pursuant to the NLRA 
provisions.34  The court applied a plain meaning reading of the language of the statute without 
reference to the underlying policy concerns that may have been anticipated by Congress.35  The 
court said: 
I believe if I were to extend the language of “collective bargaining 
agreement” to “collective bargaining agreement in effect” or 
“collective bargaining agreement as it covers the relations between 
the parties,” I would be basing that conclusion on, first, a policy 
                                                
30 Id. 
31 219 B.R. 860, 866 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).   
32 Id. at 865; see also In re Hoffman Bros. Packing Co., Inc., 173 B.R. 177, 184 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).   
33 Id. at 867. 
34 477 B.R. 378, 382 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).   
35 Id. at 383–84.   
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that is not well-articulated or found in the statute itself. Secondly, 
I’m of a view that as a factual matter I do not believe it has been 
established that the post-expiration regime would so interfere with 
whatever the congressional policy is behind Section 1113 as to the 
negate, Congress’s policy.36 
 
Rejecting any policy concerns, the court found that the language of the statute required a 
determination that section 1113 does not apply to an expired CBA.37  Upon the expiration of the 
agreement, the court suggested that section 1113 leaves parties subject to the fallback provisions 
of otherwise applicable law, including the NLRA.38 
B. Rejection Permitted by the Court 
In In re Hoffman Bros. Packing Co., Inc., the court determined that the clear Congressional 
intent behind section 1113 was to grant jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court to modify or 
otherwise alter the status quo ante rights and obligations between a debtor employer and its 
employees whether they exist under a current or expired CBA.39  In this case, there was a CBA 
between parties that commenced on February 1, 1992 and remained effective until March 31, 
1993.40  The CBA contained provisions relative to termination including an “evergreen clause” 
which would renew the CBA automatically from year to year unless one party took action to 
terminate it.41  The union took the position that when a CBA has expired, the parties must adhere 
to status quo ante while bargaining to impasse.42  The union reasoned that maintaining status quo 
ante after a collective agreement has expired promotes industrial peace by fostering a non-
coercive atmosphere that is conducive to serious negotiations on a new contract.43  Ultimately, 
the court rejected the union’s argument and held that rejection was permissible because section 
                                                
36 Id. at 382–83 (internal citations omitted). 
37 Id. at 383. 
38 Id. 
39 173 B.R. at 184.   
40 Id. at 180.   
41 Id.   
42 Id. at 183.   
43 Id.   
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1113 clearly granted jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court to modify or alter the status quo ante 
rights and obligations between a debtor employer and its employees under the terms of the 
expired CBA.44 
In In re Karykeion, Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California 
memorialized a comprehensive analysis of section 1113 jurisprudence.45  The court concluded 
that section 1113's language and purpose indicated that it permits a debtor to terminate or modify 
its ongoing obligations to the employees covered by a union, whether or not those obligations 
arise as a result of a current or expired CBA.46 
Section 1113(e) allows for a debtor to modify a CBA during “the period that it continues 
in effect” when the debtor determines that such a modification is necessary for continuation of 
the debtor's business, or to avoid irreparable harm to the estate.47  “[C]ontinues in effect” is a 
term of art used in labor law and it refers to the time between the expiration of a CBA and the 
NLRB deciding that there is an impasse.48  At the time of impasse, the two parties were no 
longer bound by continuing effects of the agreement.49 
The court noted that the intersection of the Bankruptcy Code and the NLRA was under 
heated discussion at the time this language was drafted, and this phrase was not arbitrary in its 
usage.50  The court continued, “[s]uch language is intended to give the debtors the authority to 
reject the continuing effects of expired collective bargaining agreements through compliance 
with § 1113 instead of the NLRA.”51 
                                                
44 Id. at 184, 186. 
45 435 B.R. 663, 673–75 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010).   
46 Id. at 674. 
47 Id.   
48 Id.   
49 Id.   
50 Id.    
51 Id. at 674–75. 
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 In affirming that this interpretation was consistent with other powers that the Bankruptcy 
Code gives to debtors-in-possession, the court held that disallowing a debtor to reject the residual 
effects of an expired contract would greatly impair the overriding goal of bankruptcy because the 
process would be too lengthy.52  Finally, the court emphasized the power of bankruptcy courts to 
determine if the debtor had satisfied the procedural requirements of section 1113 and if the 
debtor was entitled to terminate or modify its ongoing obligations to its workers.53 
C. Emergence of a Pattern: In re 710 Long Ridge Road Operating Company  
 710 Long Ridge Rd. Operating Company filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code in 2014 with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New 
Jersey.54  In considering the debtor’s motion for an order rejecting a CBA the court noted that as 
a threshold matter, it was necessary to determine if the language of section 1113 gives the 
debtors the authority to reject an expired CBA.55  If the threshold inquiry was answered in the 
affirmative, the court is free to enter an order approving the debtor’s application for rejection of 
the CBA so long as the court found that the debtor’s adhered to the procedural requisites in 
section 1113.56  The court noted that there was a split of authority with respect to whether section 
1113 applied to expired CBAs.57  
 The Union and the NLRB (collectively, the “Objecting Parties”) argued that because 
section 1113 only gives the debtors the authority to assume or reject a CBA, the statute does not 
                                                
52 Id. at 675.   
53 Id. at 676. 
54 In re 710 Long Ridge Road Operating Company, 518 B.R. 810 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014).   
55 Id. at 825.   
56 Id.   
57 Compare In re Karykeion, Inc., 435 B.R. 663, 675 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.2010); In re Ormet Corp., 2005 WL 2000704, 
at *2 (S.D.Ohio 2005); In re Hoffman Bros. Packing Co. Inc., 173 B.R. 177 (9th Cir. BAP 1994)(all holding that 
section 1113(c) applies to expired collective bargaining agreements); with In re Hostess Brands, Inc., 477 B.R. 378, 
379(Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2012); In re Sullivan Motor Delivery, Inc., 56 B.R. 28, 29, 31 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1985); In re San 
Rafael Baking Co., 219 B.R. 860, 866 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (all holding that section 1113 is only applicable where a 
collective bargaining agreement exists at the time the Chapter 11 case is filed). 
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grant the authority to reject the continuing terms of an expired CBA.58  The debtors argued that 
the bankruptcy court had the authority to reject the continuation of the economic terms of a post-
expiration CBA and view the language of Section 1113 that refers to “collective bargaining 
agreements” as inclusive of those collective bargaining agreements that continue as an effect by 
virtue of the NLRA.59 
 The court found the rationale relied on by the debtors and supported by the decision in In 
re Karykeion to be persuasive.60  The court concluded that the collective bargaining agreement’s 
status as either expired or unexpired has no effect on a Debtor’s need to modify or reject the 
continuing economic terms in order to ensure the debtor’s survival in bankruptcy.61  The court 
reasoned that adaptation of the Union’s rationale would result in the Debtor’s closure, 
liquidation, and lost loss of employment for hundreds of workers.62  Further, the court noted that 
the clear legislative purpose of section 1113 was to allow debtors to lower labor costs and 
reorganize successfully.63 
D. In Re Trump Entertainment Resorts Litigation and Denial of Certiorari  
In a high-profile decision, the Third Circuit affirmed a bankruptcy court determination 
allowing for reorganization of the Trump Taj Mahal.  Here, the Debtors filed a Chapter 11 
Reorganization Plan with the court contingent upon the rejection of the CBA, which expired on 
September 14, 2014.64  The CBA expired after the Debtors petitioned for bankruptcy, but before 
                                                
58 Id. at 225–26.   
59 Id. at 826. 
60 Id. at 828.   
61 Id. at 30.   
62 Id.   
63 This statement is seemingly contrary to the contention that section 1113 was a direct result of the Bildisco 
decision and served as a procedural safeguard to help organized labor when a company was engaged in Chapter 11 
reorganization. 
64 In re Trump Entm't Resorts, Inc., 519 B.R. 76, 83 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014). 
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the claim was filed with the court.65  The court addressed whether it had authority to grant the 
motion to reject an expired CBA if the Debtors satisfied the necessary requirements under 
Section 1113, and whether the court could authorize the implementation of the debtors’ new 
proposal.66  The court asserted that the Bankruptcy Code gives debtors broad powers to preserve 
value of a company.67  Ultimately, the court determined that it had the jurisdiction under section 
1113 to approve the application for the rejection of the expired CBA.68 
Furthermore, the court determined that the Debtors met the stringent procedural 
requirements for rejecting a CBA.  Id. at 86.  Under section 1113, the court must find three 
elements: (i) the debtor made a proposal; (ii) the union refused to accept the debtor’s proposal 
without good cause; and (iii) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of the CBA.69  
The court found that the Debtors met each requirement and that balance of equities favored 
rejection of the CBA because the Debtors would be forced to close the casino if relief was not 
granted.70  Therefore, the court approved the rejection of the expired CBA and authorized the 
Debtors to implement a new proposal.71 
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the court, once again, aimed to reconcile the outcomes of 
rejecting the expired CBA under the NRLA and section 1113 by interpreting the statutes as a 
whole.72  Because the laws conflicted, the court read the two statutory frameworks seriatim, and 
assumed that Congress passed each subsequent law, the NLRA and section 1113, with full 
knowledge of the existing legal landscape.73  This reliance on statutory construction, which 
                                                
65 Id.   
66 Id.   
67 Id.   
68 Id. 
69 Id.   
70 Id. at 92.   
71 Id. 
72 In re Trump Entm't Resorts, 810 F.3d at 167.   
73 Id. at 163.   
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sought to reconcile the conflicting laws, differed from the bankruptcy court’s reliance on section 
1113 procedural requirements.74  Though bankruptcy courts have been divided on how to 
interpret section 1113, the circuit court determined that the provision allowed for judicial 
evaluation of a petition to reject an expired CBA after unsuccessful negotiation.75 
 The Union argued that the Debtors are required to bargain to impasse before making any 
changes to the terms and conditions of the CBA based on the NLRA requirement that “once a 
collective bargaining relationship has been established, an employer may not make a change 
affecting the mandatory bargaining subjects without affording the Union the opportunity to 
bargain over the change.”76  Further, the Union contended that section 1113, though it allows for 
the rejection of a CBA, does not mention continuing obligations imposed by the NLRA, and thus 
the provision does not apply.77 
 The circuit court evaluated the purpose of section 1113 and reinforced that Congress 
intended the provision to allow companies latitude to restructure their labor obligations if it 
means saving jobs that would otherwise be lost during liquidation.78  It has been consistently 
held that a chapter 11 reorganization provides debtors with an opportunity to reduce or extend 
their debts so its business can achieve economically efficient long-term viability.79  The court 
noted that a contrary holding, such as affirming that section 1113 does not allow a debtor to 
reject expired CBA’s, would impede the overriding goal contemplated by Congress.80  Denying 
the Debtors the ability to reorganize based on an expired CBA would negate the rehabilitative 
                                                
74 Id. at 167.   
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 168.   
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 173.   
79 Id.   
80 Id. at 174.   
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function of Chapter 11.81  Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
affirmed the holding of the bankruptcy court.82   
V. Conclusion  
 The Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari to the Third Circuit in In re 
Trump Entertainment Resorts.83  However, the question of the application of section 1113 to 
collective bargaining agreements has been puzzling bankruptcy courts, and more recently the 
Third Circuit, for three decades.  The two most recent decisions, In Re Trump Entertainment 
Resorts and 710 Long Ridge Operating, have evoked similar language and exhibited similar 
values.  For example, both cases concluded that in balancing different interests, section 1113 
applied to expired CBA’s and the bankruptcy court had the jurisdiction to reject the agreements 
to preserve jobs. 
 The bargaining power of organized labor has been undermined in light of recent 
decisions, which calls into question the relative fairness of the reorganization process.  The fair 
treatment of creditors is a major underlying theme in bankruptcy, which as a process, seeks to 
ensure that creditors, debtors, and other affected parties are treated fairly and equitably.  Courts 
will favor contract rejection when all employee groups bear their share of wage reductions.84  
Courts will also consider whether concessions were made by suppliers, secured creditors, state 
and local taxing agencies, and management and nonunion employees.85 
                                                
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 175.   
83 Unite Here Local 54, 136 S. Ct. at 2396.   
84 Truck Drivers Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Carey Transp. 
Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 90–91 (2d Cir. 1987).   
85 See e.g., In re K&B Mounting, 50 B.R. 460, 464–68 (noting that all parties were treated equally where nonunion 
workers made equivalent concessions, there was a huge backlog of accounts payable owed to creditors, and 
principals offered to retire, resulting in large savings); see also In re Bowen Enterprises, Inc., 196 B.R. 734, 744 
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (holding for rejection because the burdens spread equitably over all affected parties; fairness 
did not require that unions be treated identically with other parties). 
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The interpretation of section 1113 is muddied by relative values of competing interests 
and mixed Congressional intent.  On one hand, courts have argued that the section applies to 
expired agreements and the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to accept or reject an agreement in 
the name of expediency in the bankruptcy process.  Conversely, other courts have attempted to 
decipher the Congressional intent behind enacting section 1113 following the Bildisco decision 
and have held that the provision does not apply to expired collective bargaining agreements 
because it was not included in the plain meaning of the statute.  The problem for organized labor 
is not the Bankruptcy Code itself, but how courts apply such provisions to cases dealing with 
corporate restructuring.  Courts are faced with weighing the importance of seamless restructuring 
and job preservation with procedural safeguards meant to protect organized labor.      
 
